Here is a report on the China military build up I've found. It's a long read, but has a lot of info in it.
it is still too early to predict exactly how China will improve its nuclear and dual nuclear/conventional warfighting forces and defenses over time,and the U.S. President’s proposed FY2022 budget shows the United States is still in the process of forming a coherent strategy and force posture as well. Itnow seems likely that China will develop a far more advanced capability for mutual assured destruction at high levels of conflict, but it will focus oneconomic and civil competition – and gray area, irregular, and conventional wars at low theater levels. China’s emergence as a direct rival to the UnitedStates and as a far more powerful military and economic power than Russia, not only is redefining the nuclear balance, but it is creating a world in whichthe risk of nuclear escalation between the major power must be evaluated in terms of three states, rather than two – and with the risk that new forms ofwarfare will further complicate the challenges for deterrence, warfighting, defense, and arms control. There is an important difference between “mutualassured destruction” and “mutual assured confusion and uncertainty.”CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWANThe PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could
pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan
to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue under China’s terms. Notably, China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities that the
PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, China would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short
duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and
pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital
imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan
surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade
operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of
the conflict.
Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and
clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include
computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders.
Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.
Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities
to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for
an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air,
and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the
north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2019, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan.
Furthermore, China continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies
onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force
attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military
risk.
The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan as well. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch
an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s
capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this
kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro- independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.
csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211004_Cordesman_Dynamics_Strategy.pdf?4gsbeFbtr2PBK0M3F_YRQw6Z6uPyaTF7
